on CBI as a political strategy, whereby certain societal demands for price stability are provided with an institutional guarantor. Such demands are clearly political in nature; yet, through CBI, they are insulated from political contestation. Since such insulation undermines the ability to challenge the economic basis of the prevailing social structure, it is perhaps unsurprising that authors who insist on a more political reading of CBI are less likely to argue the case for increased central bank independence than those who adopt a more economic reading.
I. Intr oduction
There can be no doubting the increasing importance of central banks to processes of international economic management.
1 Whilst the names of prominent central bankers may be less well known than those of politicians, and whilst the functions their banks perform receive scant public recognition, the decisions taken by central bankers have a significant bearing on the conduct of everyday life.
Academic studies of central banking typically divide into one of two traditions. For some, central bankers have shown that, once trusted to operate policy autonomously, they can consistently deliver low and stable inflation at no obvious cost in terms of output and employment.
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For others, however, this is to over-emphasise the economic dimension of CBI. A rather different line of argument is also evident within the literature. Whilst casting doubt on the empirical fact that CBI leads necessarily to superior policy performance, authors in this latter tradition suggest that this is not, in any case, the main issue.
The analysis of central bank independence (hereafter CBI) is thus reduced to a discussion of the technical efficiency of the policy-making process. Given the presumed efficiency of CBI, it is usual for authors in this tradition to express a normative preference for CBI over alternative institutional arrangements for the conduct of monetary policy.
The aim of this article is to review the contribution of the books listed above to our understanding of the process of CBI. Each raises a number of significant implications for the study of central banking that take the reader to the heart of the disputes which divide the literature. My review is based around three core themes. Firstly, I analyse the genealogy of ideas about CBI, paying particular attention to the significance of the disciplinary origins of those ideas. Secondly, I suggest likely sources of institutional dysfunctionality arising from increased CBI. Thirdly, I argue that the real motivation for CBI, given these institutional pathologies-in-waiting, are primarily domestic and political rather than global and economic. I conclude that the current trend towards CBI may lead to important sources of policy failure in the future.
II. Under standing CBI: Pr efer ences, Institutions and Ideas

CBI and Orthodox Economic Analysis
The core of the intellectual case for CBI revolves around the assumption of a persistent inflationary bias built into politicians' monetary policy preferences. It is argued that this bias can only be negated by vesting authority in policy-makers who can be trusted to choose a policy rule that is non-accommodating of inflationary tendencies; namely central bankers. 4 Central bankers are assumed to be better placed than politicians to enforce such a rule, since there is no clear symmetry of interest between the central bank and the labour market in the way that there is between the government and the labour market. Whilst legitimacy is conferred upon governments by voters in popular elections, central bankers only need satisfy a much smaller group of actors concentrated within financial markets in order to enhance their reputations. As such, central bankers are assumed to be less constrained by social pressures for accommodating inflation. This ensures that they can commit more 'credibly' than governments to operating monetary policy in line with a low inflation equilibrium and, as a result, produce superior inflation performance. So the argument goes.
There are two broad political economy challenges to this standard economic conclusion: one empirical, the other conceptual. There is, however, another body of economic work that questions, indeed rejects, the notion that monetary policy exists in a purely technical realm. Drawing on his experience as both academic and central banker, Alan Blinder suggests that the key to understanding CBI is to uncover the political dynamics that remain hidden within formal macroeconomic models of monetary policy-making. For Blinder, the politics of macroeconomics is not so much the struggle for the authority to impose efficient institutions, as it is the struggle to legitimise self-appointed authority on the basis of technical expertise.
Orthodox macroeconomists seek to sustain their authoritative voice in advocating CBI on the basis of claims that this will maximise the social welfare function. Yet, as
Blinder argues, the social welfare function bears no objective form beyond its dominant social construction. 6 It appears in orthodox models of CBI in precise mathematical terms, and the precision of the mathematical structure creates the impression that the function can be solved and an optimal policy then designed. However, the 'solution' that is offered exists only at the level of formal mathematical logic; the social welfare function has no explicit economic meaning that can be ascertained empirically before being used as the basis for policy. 7 Yet, this question cannot be asked within an orthodox intellectual framework that denies the constitutive role of politics in the economy. Within orthodox macroeconomic analysis the social welfare function is said to approximate the policy preferences of the 'representative' individual within society.
Thus, the most important question to ask about the process of central banking is who defines the social welfare function that acts as the guide for central bank interventions in the economy? 8 The major contribution of the Arestis and Sawyer volume is to deepen the conceptual challenge to these orthodox economic arguments. The orthodox case rests on the assumption that monetary policy-making institutions become efficient the more that they are deemed to be 'credible'. Credibility is conferred upon institutions by the public, who are thus granted some sort of veto over the success of policy. If the public does not believe that policy-makers will abide by their commitments to price stability, it will not adjust its behaviour in line with announcements of counter-inflationary policy, and such policy will fail.
However, those models conceptualise the representative individual as one who adopts the same cognitive approach to the question of monetary policy-making as that of orthodox macroeconomists. By little more than a definitional trick, orthodox macroeconomists are thus able to elevate themselves to the position of legitimate intellectual guardians of society's concerns for the key settings of economic management. The intellectual case for CBI is therefore less clear than its current political appeal would seem to suggest.
Yet, as Ilene Grabel argues ([AS]
, p. 90), a number of conditions must be met for standard credibility theory to be an accurate reflection of actual practice. Firstly, all market agents must derive the same knowledge about the economy for the public to act collectively in this way. Secondly, this knowledge must be correct. Thirdly, it must fit with a standard neoclassical account of the nature of the inflation/unemployment trade-off.
Fourthly, this account must also be correct. If any of these conditions fail to be met, the standard intellectual case for orthodox monetary policy cannot be sustained. Yet, given opinion poll data that show consistent public confusion about the very nature of inflation, 9 Moreover, as Keith Bain points out, a further assumption is required if it is to be argued that only an independent central bank can enforce a credible counter-inflationary policy. Governments are assumed to be less able to implement a non-accommodating policy rule because electoral considerations mean that it will always be willing to trade-off more inflation for less unemployment. Yet, there is no long-run inflation/unemployment trade-off in the neoclassical model, only a natural rate of unemployment at which prices are stable.
it is difficult to understand why we should expect any of these conditions to hold. If the representative individual does not even know what inflation is, it is unlikely that the public will be equipped with perfect knowledge of the government's inflation preferences. 10 Indeed, that case is completely dissolved when we recall that it is grounded in the assertion that governments have political incentives to be lax in the control of the money Given the conditions listed above, the assumption of perfect knowledge guarantees that all market agents know this to be the case. As such, it is necessary to add the further assumption that individuals form their expectations differently as voters than as market agents; in effect, that the act of voting initiates a temporary collective delusion on the part of all market agents. In the absence of such an assumption, it would be impossible to explain why individuals would vote for a government that would attempt to trade-off more inflation for less unemployment in a manner that they, as market agents, know to be impossible (Bain [AS], pp. 90-1). However, without this assumption, the orthodox case for CBI begins to fall apart.
supply, whereas central bankers can ensure monetary discipline because they do not. Under conditions of path-dependence, patterns of behaviour consistent with the institutional norm become the subject of routine reproduction, often to the point of becoming locked in. The timing of institutional reform therefore has significant long-run consequences, because it is usual to base reform on attempts to embed the dominant norm of the day. Whilst the prevailing norm may only be temporary, once institutionally embedded it is likely to continue to influence behaviour. In this section, I
argue that the recent trend towards CBI may prove to have path-dependent effects -many of which will have perverse economic consequences. CBI can only be more than a temporary palliative to inflation if it is an institutional reflection of a general theory of inflation which is universally applicable across all points of time and space, rather than a reaction to contingent political events. It is my contention that the latter characterisation is the more appropriate.
A Genealogy of Inflated Ideas?
The twentieth century was unusually inflation-prone compared with those that preceded it. However, this was not a simple linear expansion in the price level. productivity rates to be absorbed in changing currency prices, rather than in the price of consumer goods. 13 In the 1970s, inflationary pressures were assumed to result from one-off supply shocks that exacerbated increasing technological obsolescence at the end of the Fordist era, coupled with overly optimistic assumptions about the nature of the inflation-unemployment trade-off. The proposed institutional solution was to create additional policy-making capacities able to sustain prolonged periods of crisis management whilst the shift to a new technological-economic paradigm was negotiated. 14 In the 1980s, inflationary pressures were assumed to result from supply rigidities within the labour market that led to cost increases above the rate of productivity growth and, as a consequence, wage-push inflation. The proposed institutional solution was to engage in labour market reform to restrict the access of trade unions to the wage negotiating process and, hence, to provide a disciplinary anchor for wage increases. 15 In the 1990s, inflationary pressures were assumed to result from financial market actors failing to confer a reputation for counter-inflationary credibility onto domestic monetary policy-makers. The proposed institutional solution was to provide a policymaking context that tied the hands of governments by creating an external enforcement mechanism for counter-inflationary policy. 16 As such, it was only in the 1990s that assumptions about the prevailing type of Of course, we have no means of predicting the way in which future price trends will play themselves out, nor the form that future inflationary tendencies will take. However, should factors other than reputation for counter-inflationary credibility dominate the emergence of inflationary tendencies in the future, current institutional provisions for CBI may become increasingly dysfunctional. Institutional reforms cast solely in the image of credibility theories will therefore be likely to inject new sources of contradiction into the process of economic management within contemporary capitalism.
Indeed, institutionalised policy-making cast in the image of any 'general' theory of inflation is likely to prove contradictory whenever the contextually-specific determinants of inflation change. This, at any rate, would appear to be the main conclusion of Thomas
Mayer's account of the inflationary experience of the 1970s in the United States. Mayer asks whether the experience of the 'Great Inflation' can be understood in terms of the evolution of perfectly efficient monetary policy-making institutions. He concludes (p. 49) that it cannot. Rather, he focuses on the extent to which popular assumptions that extant institutional arrangements were already efficient led to clearly sub-optimal policy outcomes.
Mayer's primary contribution to our understanding of the process of central banking is to highlight the degree to which central bankers are guided by the ideas of economists.
He shows that Federal Reserve governors hardly ever challenged either staff forecasts or the reasoning on which they were based (pp. [18] [19] ; that the ideas of economists thus became deeply embedded as an institutionalised 'common-sense' (p. 92); and that policy was consequently slow to adjust to the emergence of qualitatively new inflationary pressures (pp. 119-24).
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Of course, the ideas on which orthodox economists base their general theories of inflation today are very different to those of their predecessors in the 1970s. However, the technical details are not the most significant aspect of the debate. It is more important to note that, of all the social sciences, intellectual consensus is most prevalent within economics.
The economists who were advising the Federal Reserve believed both that they had intimate knowledge of the nature of the inflationary process and that institutional capabilities were already in place to tackle inflationary pressures at source. answer to this question can be given. Yet, a reasonable case can be made for two related political, as opposed to economic, problems that CBI solves for politicians: externalising distributional problems and providing an automatic pilot for potentially unpopular policies.
IV. Political Logics for CBI?
Domestic Distribution and CBI
Whilst much has been written about CBI and the need for 'market sensitive' policies within contemporary capitalism, little effort has been made to analyse the implications of increased 'market sensitivity' for the distribution of power within society. It is clear that financial markets have a significant impact on the way in which society is organised, since the allocation of credit is the sine qua non of distributional politics. Consequently, when the decision to cede operational autonomy to central bankers is justified in terms of the need for market sensitive policies, it is equally clear that a particular way of organising society is being simultaneously constructed and defended against possible redefinition.
The social basis of financial trading has changed markedly in recent years, and has changed in a way which is selective of a social structure of accumulation grounded in the monetary orthodoxy that CBI is designed to deliver.
The most significant recent development in the internal operation of financial markets has been the increasing exposure of an ever greater number of people to dominant patterns of market trading. For some, such exposure has been consciously accepted through attempts to diversify savings away from simple interest earning bank accounts.
For others, increased exposure has been less conscious, being an unintended consequence of having a mortgage and a private pension plan.
The social basis of market sensitivity has therefore spread ever more widely throughout society. In consequence, more people now have a direct material interest in the future health of the financial system. Thus, the fact that more people are now exposed to dominant patterns of trading within financial markets corresponds to the likelihood that more will seek the implementation of the type of policies that independent central banks routinely introduce to bolster and support those patterns.
Of course, the social basis of demands for orthodox monetary policies is by no means spread evenly throughout society. Those with savings benefit from an accumulation strategy built upon monetary orthodoxy whilst those lacking such resources tend to be Firstly, the act of delegating policy-making responsibility to the central bank is justified by the assumptions that central bankers are less likely than governments to accommodate inflationary pressures, and that they are therefore more likely to control the growth of the money supply in line with a stable non-inflationary equilibrium.
However, I have argued that this is fundamentally to misunderstand the process of credit creation within contemporary capitalism. Money supply growth is determined as much by the actions of the private sector acting in its own interests as by the central bank acting in the public interest. In such circumstances, no amount of CBI can ever be sufficient to render truly credible central bank announcements on the control of the money supply, because the money supply is not solely its to control. So long as actors operating within the private sector retain the ability to create credit as a means of making profits, the money supply will continue to be political in a wider sense of the word. The trend towards CBI is therefore not only built upon flawed economic theory, but a theory which is grounded in a flawed understanding of the very nature of the economy.
Secondly, I have argued that the questionable economic reasoning on which the trend towards CBI is based leads to potentially inappropriate institutional design. Monetary policy-making institutions have often reflected economists' assurances that they have developed a 'general' theory of inflation. However, the subsequent emergence of qualitatively new inflationary pressures has undermined such claims. Doubts remain whether CBI is the optimal institutional response to current inflationary pressures; but, even if this proves to be the case, it is highly improbable that it will also provide the basis for the optimal response to future inflationary pressures. Particular experiences of inflation continue to be dominated by contextually-specific factors. Whilst this remains so, the trend towards CBI has bequeathed a potentially inertial institutional apparatus appropriate to a merely contingent inflationary moment.
Thirdly, I have argued that the debate about CBI must be understood in political as well as economic terms. Although the trend towards CBI may create institutional capacities unsuited to future tasks of economic management, this may not be the most important point. The decision to cede operational responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy should be seen as a statement of social intent. It is a signal by the government that it will defend both a social structure of accumulation based on monetary orthodoxy and also the particular interests incorporated into that structure. CBI therefore creates an institutional guarantor for the continued reproduction of the current balance of social forces both domestically and internationally. The most notable outcome of the trend towards central bank independence is the reduction of the number of potential sites of resistance to the overall orientation of government economic policy.
